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Abstract: This paper discusses both social welfare and social choice using Arrow’s impossibility theorem for 
multi-profile preference case and two versions of it for single-profile preference case. Between these two 
versions first one assumes a two-individual society and the second one, which is similar to a theorem of 
Pollak, assuming two or more individuals. In single-profile version decisiveness, simple and complex 
diversity must occur. This paper considers a special case of Arrow’s theorem, namely single-profile 
preference. Diversity and decisiveness of preferences are discussed for two individuals and more than two 
individuals in a society. 
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Introduction 
     This paper is related to welfare economics and sociology, in particular social choice 
theory. Here we have tried to give various aspects of economics and sociology in 
mathematical terms and simple ways. The social welfare function (SWF) first studied by 
Arrow, are the rules for transforming preference profile into social preference orderings. 
Arrow’s theorem indicates that the aggregate of individuals’ preferences  will not satisfy 
the five conditions namely i) completeness and transitivity, ii) universality, iii) Weak 
Pareto optimality, iv) independence of irrelevant alternatives and v) non-dictatorship 
simultaneously. So that in Arrow’s theorem one of the individuals becomes a dictator.  
    Arrow in his impossibility theorem used multi-profile preference. But here we will 
describe both multi-profile and two versions of single-profile preference. Single-profile 
Arrow theorems were first proved in the late 1970s and early 1980s by Parks (1976), 
Hammond (1976), Kemp and Ng (1976), Pollak (1979), Roberts (1980) and Rubinstein 
(1984). Single-profile theorems were developed in response to an argument of Samuelson 
(1967) against Arrow. Single-profile Arrow theorem established that bad results 
(dictatorship, or illogic of social preferences, or, more generally, impossibility of 
aggregation) could be proved with one fixed preference profile (or set of ordinal utility 
functions), provided the profile is “diverse” enough (Parks 1976, Hammond 1976, Kemp 
and Ng 1976, Pollak 1979, Roberts 1980 and Rubinstein 1984). 
    In multi-profile Arrow theorem we consider N-individuals as like Arrow (1963). But in 
single-profile case we consider two-individuals for theorem-1 and two or more individuals 
for theorem-2. In single-profile models, neutrality is the natural assumption to substitute for 
Arrow’s independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption. The second version is 
close to Pollak’s theorem, where there are two or more individuals and strengthens 
neutrality to neutrality/monotonicity as like Pollak (1979) and others. In both multi-profile 
and single-profile cases of course there is a dictator. But dictators in single profile models 
are sometimes innocuous than in multi-profile case. 
 
Notations 
    Let N = {1,2,…, n} be the set of individuals or voters which are finite and N is finite 
subset of the non-negative real line +R and ( ) 2# ≥= nN . The set of alternatives or social 
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options is denoted by { },...,, zyxX = . For any Xyx ∈,  one prefers x to y or he prefers y to 
x, or he is indifferent to the choice between x and y. We can write these possibilities, 
respectively, as follows: xPy, yPx, xIy. Sometimes we use the notation xRy to mean that 
either x is preferred to y or x is indifferent to y, so that y is not preferred to x. Person i’s 
preference relation is iR . yxRi  means person i prefers x to y or is indifferent between them; 
yxPi  means i prefers (strictly) x to y; yxIi  means i is indifferent between them. The utility 
function (Islam, Mohajan and Moolio 2009 a,b, 2011) as follows: ( ) ( )nxxxuxu ,...,, 21= . In 
preference relation we can write u(x) > u (y) then  xPy.  
 
Multi-Profile Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem 
     Arrow’s impossibility theorem (Arrow 1963) is very subtle but delicate. Arrow showed 
that the preferences of many individuals be aggregated into social preference but there is a 
flaw in this aggregation. Because a social welfare function cannot be derived by democratic 
vote to reflect the preferences of all the individuals in the society. Here we will try to give a 
very simple version of Arrow’s impossibility theorem following Feldman 1974, Barbera 
1980, 2010, Bossert and Weymark 2003, Geanokoplos 2005, Breton and Weymark 2006, 
Islam1997, 2008, Islam, Mohajan and Moolio 2009 a ,b, 2011 and Miller 2009. 
     For simplicity let us consider there are two individuals in the society and three social 
alternatives x, y, z. For the preference orderings for individual 1 or 2 there are exactly 
6×6=36 different constellations of individual preferences possible in the society (figure-1) 
where alternatives are ordered from top to bottom (Feldman 1974, Islam, Mohajan and 
Moolio 2009 a, b).     
   Before going to define Arrow’s impossibility theorem we have to study the following 
requirements (Arrow 1963, Sen 1970, Feldman 1974, Feldman and Serrano 2006, Islam 
1997, 2008, and Islam, Mohajan and Moolio 2009 a, b, 2011): 
    
Completeness and Transitivity 
     Completeness in social choice implies for any pair of alternatives x and y then either xRy 
or yRx must hold, and transitivity in social choice implies for any triple  x, y, z we have for 
xRy and yRz must imply xRz. The social preference relations generated by a collective 
choice rule must be complete and transitive.  The requirement says that a collective choice 
 
Figure-1 The preference orderings for individual 1 or 2 there are exactly 36 different 
constellations of individual preferences possible in the society. 
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rule must always permit social choices between alternatives, and that social choices must 
be consistent, or not inherently self-contradictory. The axiom of completeness seems 
sufficient reasonable but we explain some objections with it as follows (Feldman and 
Serrano 2006):  
• If x and y are two complicated parts of a new type computer, an individual Mr. 
X does not know about them and may be unwilling to choose. 
• If Mr. X is given the choice between shooting his two intimate friends he must 
prevent for this. 
• If Mr. X depends on his parents, his friends, his religious books, his government 
etc., he may be incapable of making choices himself. 
We have seen that transitivity is fairly reasonable but in a real society there are objections 
to the transitivity assumption. In some circumstances transitivity may not be true. Suppose 
Mr. X prefers apple (A) to banana (B) and banana to cherry (C). Transitivity relation 
implies that Mr. X must prefer A to C but sometimes he may prefer C to A. If  xIy,  yIz then 
by transitivity xIz which is least realistic, since it can be applied repeatedly to get nonsense 
results: Let 1t  be a cup of tea with one grain of sugar in it; let 2t  be a cup of tea with two 
grains of sugar in it; and so on. Hence Mr. X can not taste the difference between nt  and 
1+nt , for any Nn ∈  he must be indifferent between them. But he must be indifferent 
between 0t  and 000,000,000,000,1t  which is probably false. We will assume that every individual 
in a society is rational that is every member in the society choose best alternative for 
himself. 
 
Universality or Unrestricted Domain (U) 
     In social choice theory U is a property of SWF’s in which all preferences of all the 
voters are factored into the final ordering of societal choices. Hence U is a common 
requirement for all social choice functions. U indicates that the SWF accounts for all 
preferences among all voters to yield a unique and complete ranking of social choices. The 
SWF must be wide enough in scope to work from any logical set of individual orderings. 
The Pareto principal gives a perfectly fine social orderings if the preferences of individuals 
are unanimous. But in the case of incomplete preference relations it will not have a social 
orderings so that it fails to satisfy this requirement of Arrow. Similarly, the method of 
majority decision (MMD) may yield intransitives in some cases so the MMD also fails for 
U. According to this restriction in figure-1, the rule should give us a social preference 
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ordering for every cell not just for the easy ones, like those where there is unanimous 
agreement that is the diagonal cells in figure-1. 
 
Pareto Principal 
 
Weak Pareto Principal:  The Social choice function must satisfy the Pareto principle in 
the weak form that is if everyone prefers  x to y, then the society must also prefer x to y.  
Mathematically, for any ,, Xyx ∈  xPyyxPi i ⇒∀ :   i.e., if alternative x is ranked above y 
for all orderings  ( )NRR ,...,1  then x is ranked higher than y by ( )NRRF ,...,1 . Pareto 
consistency is a very mild requirement for a collective choice rule (CCR). If the societies 
are ruled by external forces then one can not expect it to hold in societies. For example, 
(Feldman 1974) everyone prefers lust and gambling, on the one hand, to chastity and 
frugality on the other, but where, according to a Holy Book, the society state of chastity 
and frugality is preferable to the society state of lust and gambling. But if the external 
forces, thinking for their economy, naturally would recommend lust and gambling. 
Strong Pareto Principal: For all Xyx ∈,  if  yxRi  for all i, and yxPi  for some i, then xPy. 
Independent of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA): IIA means that the social ranking of x vis-
à-vis y must depend only on individual rankings of x vs. z or y vs. w or z vs. w or any other 
such irrelevancy. Let X be a set of alternatives, R be the set of social ordering and C(Y, R ) 
be the choice function, then for a single individual the choice made from any fixed 
environment Y should be independent of the very existence of alternatives outside of Y . 
Again consider, if R and R′  be the relations determined by f  corresponding respectively to 
two sets of individual preferences, ( )nRR ,...,1  and ( )nRR ′′,...,1 . If iyRxyxRXyx ii ∀′⇔∈   ,, , 
then C(Y, R) and ( )RYC ′,  are the same. Condition IIA is the most subtle of all the 
requirements. Suppose society chooses democracy (d) over communism (c) and fascism (f ) 
is their third alternative. At one stage everyone of the society suddenly changes the 
desirability of f  but no one changes his mind about d vs. c. The independence requirement 
says that, if society is faced with the choice between d and c, and only those two, it must 
still choose d over c. The standard example of a CCR that violates independence is the rule 
of weighted voting. Let the society be made up of two individuals 1 and 2. Suppose 1’s 
initial preferences are cdPfP 11 , while 2’s initial preferences are cdPfP 22  . Suppose a 
person’s first choice gets a weight of 10 points, a second choice gets 7 points, and a third 
choice get 3 points. If the social choice is between c and d, d gets 7+7=14, and c gets 
10+3=13 points; so d is socially preferred to c. Now let 1 become totally disillusioned with 
f ; his ordering changes to fcPdP 11 . Now if d vs. c vote is repeated, d gets, 10+7=17 points, 
and c gets, 10+7=17 points. Society has become indifferent between d and c; even though 
neither 1 nor 2 changed his mind about these two alternatives. 
 
Non-dictatorship 
    It is required that the Social welfare function should not be dictatorial. That is, there 
should be no individual such that whenever he prefers x to y, society must prefers x to y, 
irrespective of the preferences else. This is called the condition of non-dictatorship. 
Mathematically, there is no individual i such that for every element in the domain of rule f, 
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Xyx ∈∀ ,  such that xPyyxPi ⇒ . Anonymous voting systems with at least two voters 
satisfy the non-dictatorship property. The dictatorship is undesirable in the society. First, it 
is undesirable because one’s worst enemy might be dictator. Second, it is not a collective 
choice rule. So that dictatorship may cause the violation of human rights. No dictator 
assumption is different in a single-preference profile from what it is in the multi-profile 
case. For example, in the single-profile case if all the individuals in a society have the same 
preferences and if Pareto optimality holds then by definition everyone is a dictator. If 
individual i is indifferent among all the alternatives, she is by definition a dictator.  
    The Pareto consistency requirement says a CCR must respect unanimous opinion: if both 
1 and 2 prefer one alternative to another, then society must also prefer the one to the other. 
For example, given the configuration of individual preferences of the 1st row, 3rd column 
cell of figure-1, the Pareto requirement says x and y must be socially preferred to z. Now 
consider the independence requirement. Suppose that, when applied to the constellation of 
preferences, 
                                                   1                                       2 
                                1st                x                                       y 
                                2nd               y                                       x 
                                3rd                z                                       z 
 
a collective choice rule gives x is socially preferred to y . Then yxP1  providing that yxP1  
and xyP2 , no matter how 1 and 2 changes their feelings about the irrelevant alternative z. 
Similarly, we must have yPx or  xIy whenever yxP1 and xyP2 . 
      We are now in a position to discuss Arrow’s impossibility theorem as follows (for 
geometrical interpretation and combinational approach to Arrows theorem see Islam, 
Mohajan and Moolio 2009a: 
 
Arrow’s theorem: Suppose that the set of alternatives X has at least three elements and 
the conditions (i) to (v) are satisfied. Then there exists an individual Uuk ∈ , such that 
                ( ) kn wwwwW =,...,, 21 , some k , nk ≤≤1     
that is, the group preference coincides with that of some one (single) individual. 
 
Single-Profile Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem 
     We have discussed multi-profile version of Arrow’s theorem. In this section we will 
discuss two simple versions of the same theorem but for single-profile case only following 
Feldman and Serrano (2008).  We will also introduce some illustrative examples and 
definitions to clarify the concepts that we attempt to discuss. We have defined some 
definitions above and here we add some definitions which are related to single-profile 
model. Some of them are discussed as follows:  
Voting Paradox: Now we discuss the Condorcet voting paradox in which there is no 
Condorcet winner (an alternative that beats every other alternative in sequence of pair-wise 
majority contests), (Condorcet 1785). Let us assume that there are 17 voters of three types 
and three alternatives x, y, z. Let preference relations being as follows: 
Type 1: xPyPz  by 8 voters, 
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Type 2: yPzPx  by 5 voters, 
Type 3: zPxPy  by 4 voters. 
In an election a vote between x and y, candidate x collects 8 + 4 = 12 votes and y collects 5 
votes, so that x wins. Again a vote between y and z, candidate y collects 8 + 5 = 13 votes 
and z collects 4 votes, so that y wins. Again a vote between x and z, candidate x collects 8 
votes and z collects 4 + 5 = 9 votes, so that z wins. We observe that there is a cycle in the 
voting results where x is defeated by y, and y is defeated by z, and also z is defeated by x 
which is a voting paradox. 
Neutrality: Suppose individual preferences for w vs. z are identical to individual 
preferences for x vs. y, then the social preference for w vs. z must be identical to the social 
preference x vs. y. More specifically, for all x, y, z and w assume that for all i, yxPi  if and 
only if zwPi  and wzPi  if and only if xyPi . Then wRz if and only if xRy, and zRw if and 
only if yRx.                                                               
Simple Diversity Preference: There exists triple of alternatives  x, y, z, such that yxPi  for 
all i, but opinions are split on  x vs. z, and on  y vs. z. That is, some individuals prefer x to z 
and some individuals prefer z to x, and some individuals prefer y to z and some individuals 
prefer z to y.  
 
Illustrative Examples in a single-profile and two Individuals Model 
    Let us consider there are two individuals and three alternatives, and also assume no 
individual indifference between any pair of alternatives. Preferences of the two individuals 
are indicate from top (most preferred) to bottom (least preferred) and last column indicates 
society’s preference. Now we will illustrate 5 examples from Feldman and Serrano (2008). 
Observe that if one of the five examples discards, the remaining four may be mutually 
consistent. In all the examples 1 to 4 we use the same profile and all satisfy simple 
diversity. In example-5 we will modify the individual preferences. 
Example 1                   Individual 1             Individual 2                 Social choice                             
                           x                              z 
             y                   x                          xPy,  xIz & yIz 
             z                    y  
Decision: Transitivity assumption fails, since xIz and zIy should imply xIy, but society has 
xPy 
Example 2                   Individual 1             Individual 2               Social choice   
                           x                              z 
y                   x                             xIyIz                                   
z                    y  
Decision: Pareto (weak or strong) fails, since yxP1  and yxP2  should imply xPy, but society 
has xIy. 
Example 3                   Individual 1             Individual 2           Social choice   
                           x                              z                             x 
y                   x                             z                    
z                    y                             y 
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Decision: Neutrality fails, Consider preference of x vs. z, two individuals are spilt that is 
individual 1 prefers x to z and individual 2 prefers z to x so individual 1 gets her way. 
Again in y vs. z the two individuals are split and individual 2 gets her way.  
Example 4                Individual 1             Individual 2           Social choice 
                           x                              z                          x 
y                   x                         y                 
z                    y                         z 
Decision: Individual 1 is a dictator, so that no dictatorship assumption fails.  
 
We have observed that although in examples 1 to 4 we use same profile but social 
preferences are different. Also all satisfy simple diversity assumption. Following example-
5 modifies the individual preferences. 
 Example 5                Individual 1             Individual 2         Social choice 
                           x                              z                          x 
z                               x                          z                    
                                              y                   y                          y 
Decision: Simple diversity fails, since options are no longer split over two pairs of 
alternatives. 
 
Some Elementary Arrow Paradoxes and Arrow’s Theorem in a Single-profile Version 
when n = 2 
   Although IIA is an essential part in multi-profile Arrow’s impossibility theorem but it 
does not play any role in single-profile case. We use neutrality assumption in single-profile 
instead of IIA. First we introduce Samuelson’s reduction ad absurdum (Samuelson 1977, 
Feldman and Serrano 2008) as follows:  
Example 6 (Samuelson’s Chocolates) There are two individuals. There is a box of 1000 
indivisible chocolates to be distributed between them. Both of the individuals are fond of 
chocolates, and each is hungry enough to eat all of them. The alternatives are 0x = (1000, 
0); 1x = (999, 1); 2x = (998, 2),…,  where the first number in each pair is the number of 
chocolates going to individual 1 and the second is the number going to individual 2. Here 
any rational individual would say that 1x  is better than 0x   i.e., 01Pxx . So that it would be 
legal to take a chocolate from individual 1, when he has 1000 of them, and gives it to 
individual 2. Let n < 1000, the individual preferences are 10001xPxn  and nxPx 21000 . By the 
condition neutrality we get 
nxPx 21000 ! That is, society should give all the chocolates to 
individual 2! 
     Samuelson’s chocolates example is a serious problem on neutrality.  Neutrality would 
have implied that all the x’s are socially indifferent. So that it is illogical if x1Px0. In fact, 
any social decision procedure that simply counts instances of yxPi , xyPi  and yxIi , but 
does not weigh strength of feelings, satisfies neutrality. On the basis of Samuelson’s 
chocolates example we will introduce a proposition from Feldman and Serrano (2008) 
which is a strong result and we hope our proof is clearer than theirs. 
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Proposition 1: Assume  n = 2, and the strong Pareto principle and neutrality hold. 
Suppose there are two alternatives x and y, and for the two individuals i and j, yxPi  and 
xyPj . Suppose that social preference is  xPy. Then individual i is a dictator. 
Proof: Let p and q be two alternatives in the society and let individual i’s preference is 
qpPi . We will show that social preference is pPq. Let contrary, so that pqPj . Strong 
Pareto implies pqR j  for all j and pqPj  for some j, then social preference is qPp. So that 
person j is a dictator but we have person i is a dictator, a contradiction. Again neutrality 
implies that for four alternatives p, q, w and z, zwPi  implies qpPi . Hence wPz  implies  
pPq, so that individual i  is a dictator. Q. E. D. 
 
Fleurbaey and Mongin Graphical Arrow Impossibility Argument 
     Samuelson (1977) offered a graphical argument against Arrow’s theorem with 
neutrality, an argument that was simplified and improved by Fleubaey and Mongin (2005). 
Assume                                  
Figure  2   Fleurbaey and Morgin’s Arrow impossibility argument. 
 
                   1u (North) 
 
 
                                                      
                                                       
•
 u (w) 
                                                                       u (z) 
                                                                    
•
 
 
                                                                                              
•
 u (x) 
 
                                                                               
•
 u (y) 
                                                                                                              1u  (East) 
that there are two individuals, and a set of alternatives  x, y,  z,…. Let 1u  and 2u  be the 
utilities of individuals 1 and 2 respectively. Consider the graph in figure-2. Each alternative 
shows up in the graph as a utility pair, for example  ( ) ( ) ( )( )xuxuxu 21  ,=  represents utility of 
alternative x. Now draw horizontal and vertical straight lines through u (z) creating four 
quadrants. North-east directions are indicated in figure-2. We assume that complete and 
transitivity social preferences, strong Pareto and neutrality are satisfied. 
      First consider for two utility vectors ( )xu  and ( )yu  which are on south-east quadrant 
and choose them so that ( )xu  is north-east of ( )yu . In society zIx is impossible, since if zIx 
then zIy must satisfy. Again if yIz  and zIx then by transitivity we can write xIy. Finally  
( )xu  is north-east of ( )yu  so that by Pareto optimality xPy. Hence social choice will be zPx  
or xPz. Let social choice be xPz and let w be another alternative such that ( )wu  is in the 
north-west quadrant then  wPz, also if ( )wu  is in the south-west quadrant then zPw. All the 
cases above show that social preferences are always depend on individual 1’s choice that is 
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individual 1 is a dictator. Similarly if social preference be zPx then individual 2 would have 
been the dictator. So that Fleurbaey and Mongin graph produces Arrow impossibility. But 
there are two drawbacks to Fleurbaey and Mongin graphical impossibility argument as 
follows: 
• It has the disadvantage that it requires the use of the utility functions 1u  and 2u , 
and it is cleaner to dispense with utility functions and simply use preference 
relations for individuals. 
• It incorporates a crucial diversity assumption without being explicit about it. 
Assume the existence of the triple of utility vectors  ( )xu , ( )yu  and ( )zu , with 
their respective locations in the utility diagram, is in fact exactly the assumption 
of simple diversity; both 1 and 2 prefer x to y, but opinions are split on x vs. z 
and y vs. z. 
 
Single-profile Arrow Impossibility Theorem 1 
     Let us consider there are two individuals say i =1, 2 and four alternatives x, y, z and w in 
the society. Here we only discuss single-profile version of Arrow’s impossibility theorem 
(Feldman and Serrano 2008). We will show how five conditions above are mutually 
inconsistent. By strong and weak Pareto principle we can say for i =1, 2; yxPi  implies  xPy 
and both individuals are dictators. Again by simple diversity yxPi  for i =1, 2  but opinions 
are split on x vs. z and y vs. z. Since opinions are split on x vs. z, one individual prefer x to 
z, while the other prefers z to x. If xPz, then by proposition-1 the individual who prefers x to 
z is a dictator. Similarly, if zPx then by proposition-1 the individual who prefers z to x is a 
dictator. Again if zIx, then with xPy we yield transitivity result zPy. But opinions are split 
on y vs. z. Then as before one person prefers y to z and another person prefers z to y. By 
proposition-1 the individual who prefers y to z is a dictator and similarly who prefers z to y 
is another dictator. Neutrality implies for any four alternatives x, y, z and w for i =1, 2, yxPi  
if and only if zwPi and wzPi  if and only if xyPi . Then wRz if and only if xRy, and zRw if 
and only if yRx. In both cases as before we find a dictator. Now we are in a position to 
introduce Arrow’s Impossibility theorem for a single-profile and two-individuals case as 
follows: 
 
Theorem  1 (Feldman and Serrano 2008): Assume n = 2. The assumptions of complete and 
transitive social preferences, strong Pareto, neutrality, simple diversity and no dictator are 
mutually inconsistent. 
Proof: Assume there are two individuals in the society and they are i = 1 and 2. For three 
individuals Xzyx ∈,,  we can write yxPi . By simple diversity preference we can split 
yxPi  as follows: Some individuals prefer x to z, some individuals prefer z to x. By 
proposition-1 if xPz then individual 1 is a dictator and if zPx then individual 2 is a dictator. 
Also some individuals prefer y to z and some individuals prefer z to y, so that by 
proposition-1 if yPz then individual 1 is a dictator and if zPy then individual 2 is a dictator. 
      Again completeness implies if xIy then yIx. The transitivity implies xIy and yPz implies 
xPz. Now we split this relations between x and y then if individual 1 prefers x to y then 
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individual 2 prefers y to x. By proposition-1 if xPy then individual 1 is a dictator and if yPx 
then individual 2 is a dictator. 
     Again if both individual i’s preference relation is yxPi  then by weak or strong Pareto 
optimality we have xPy. Now we can split this preference relation as follows: If we 
consider the split between x vs. z we can write if individual 1 prefers x to z then individual 
2 prefers z to x. So that by proposition-1 if xPz then individual 1 is a dictator and if zPx   
then individual 2 is a dictator.  
     Now it is clear that in every case we have a dictator. So that if all the assumptions 
except no dictatorship condition are satisfied, then we have a dictator always. Hence the 
conditions are mutually inconsistent. Q. E. D. 
 
Diversity in Single-Profile World 
 
Let X be any non-empty set of individuals in the society, X ′  be the compliment of X which 
may be empty. X is partitioned into two non-empty subsets 1X  and 2X . Now we introduce 
standard Arrow array as follows: 
                    Individual 1                         Individual 2                              Individual 3                   
                         x    z    y 
   y    x    z 
     z    y    x. 
 
We have defined above simple-diversity and now we will define stronger diversity. The 
stronger diversity assumption was in fact used by Parks (1976) and Pollak (1979). Pollak 
diversity is as follows:  
“Imagine any logically possible sub-profile of individual preferences over three 
hypothetical alternatives  x, y and z. Then there exists three actual alternatives a, b and c for 
which the sub-profile of preferences exactly matches that logically possible sub-profile 
over x, y and z”. 
      To clarify the Pollak diversity we consider two individuals and three alternatives 
(Feldman and Serrano 2008). Pollak diversity would require that every one of the following 
arrays be represented somewhere in the actual preference profile of the two people over the 
actual alternatives: 
                               Figure  3: Pollack diversity arrays for n = 2. 
                      
1      2 1      2 1     2 1      2 1      2 1      2 
x     x 
y     y 
z      z 
x      x 
y      z 
z      y 
x     y 
y     z 
z     x 
x     y 
y     x 
z     z 
x     z 
y     x 
z     y 
x     z 
y    y 
z     x 
Here the number of arrays in the table above is 3!= 6. If n = 3 we would have triples of 
columns instead of pairs, and there would have to be ( ) 36!3 2 =  such triples. So that with n 
individuals, the number of required n triples would be ( ) 1 !3 −n . Obviously, the number of 
arrays required for Pollak diversity raises exponentially with  n. Parks’ (1976) diversity in 
society is very similar to Pollak’s, although not so clear, and he indicates that “it requires at 
least n3  alternatives. . . ”. 
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   Now we define decisive set and minimally sized decisive set as follows:  
Decisive set: We say that a set of individuals X is decisive if it is non-empty and if for all 
alternatives x and y, if yxPi  for all i in X, then xPy. X is a minimally sized decisive set if 
there is no decisive set of smaller cardinality.  
   According to the definition of decisive set the followings are appropriate: 
• If an individual i is a dictator, then i by himself is a minimally sized decisive 
set. 
• Although without two or more members, and any set strictly containing i is also 
decisive, but not minimally sized. 
• By the Pareto principle (weak or strong) implies that the set of all people is 
decisive. 
In the light of above discussion we can modify diversity assumption as follows: 
 
Complex diversity: For any decisive set X with two or more members, there exists a triple 
of alternatives  x, y and z such that yxPi  for all i in X; such that zyPi  and xzPi  for everyone 
outside of X; and such that X can be partitioned into non-empty subsets 1X  and 2X , where 
the members of 1X  all put z last in their rankings over the triple, and the members of 2X  
all put  z  first in their rankings over the triple. Comparisons between simple diversity and 
complex diversity are given below: 
• If n = 2 and weak Pareto holds then both of them are equivalent. 
• If n > 2, neither are implied the other, but they are both implied by Pollak 
diversity. 
The following example shows that for decisive set { }3 ,2=X  i.e., { }21 =X , { }32 =X , 
{ }1=′X  then the preference profile is consistent with complex diversity and an Arrow 
impossibility yields.  
Example 7      Individual 1       Individual 2            Individual 3               Social choice 
                               x           z                   y                             
         y                        x                              z                            xPy, yPz, zPx 
           z           y                   w                           xPw, yPw, zPw 
                               w                       w                              x 
Decision: Transitivity for social preferences fails, with a P cycle among  x, y, and z. 
 
A Single-profile Arrow/Pollak Impossibility Theorem 2 when n ≥ 2 
     For n ≥ 2 we need to strengthen neutrality assumption, which we call 
neutrality/monotonicity and is defined as follows: 
Neutrality/monotonicity: For all x, y, z and w, assume that for all i, yxPi  implies zwPi  
and for all i, wzPi  implies xyPi . Then  xPy  implies  wPz. 
   A single-profile Arrow/Pollak impossibility theorem when n ≥ 2 is not restricted to a two 
individuals society as like theorem-1. First we proof the following proposition which is 
parallel to proposition-1 (Feldman and Serrano 2008). 
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Proposition  2  Assume n ≥ 2 neutrality/monotonicity. Assume there is a non-empty group 
of individuals and a pair of alternatives x and y, such that yxPi  for all i in X and xyPi  for 
all i not in X. Suppose that xPy then X is decisive. 
Proof: Let we have a set of four alternatives { }wzyxX ,,,= . By the definition of 
neutrality/monotonicity for all Xi ∈ , yxPi  implies zwPi . Then xPy implies wPz. Therefore 
X is decisive set. Again by neutrality/monotonicity for all Xi ∈ , xyPi  implies wzPi . Then 
yPx implies zPw. In this case also X is decisive. Q. E. D. 
     Now we will discuss some assumptions to state a single-profile Arrow/Pollak 
impossibility theorem as follows: Pareto principle states that the set of all individuals is 
decisive. Hence decisive sets exist. By the definition minimal decisive set we can write, it 
is the smallest decisive set. Let X be a minimal decisive set. If X is not minimal decisive 
then X has two or more members. Let { }zyxX  , ,= , a partition of X are two non-empty 
subsets 1X  and 2X . Since X is decisive which implies  xPy. Now we consider the social 
preference for  x vs. z. Let zRx, we have xPy, then by transitivity zPy. Then 2X  becomes 
decisive by proposition-2, which is impossible because we consider X as a minimal 
decisive set. Again if xPz by completeness, in this case as like above 1X  is decisive which 
is impossible. Hence in X there is only one individual which makes that individual a 
dictator. Now we are in a position to state a single-profile Arrow/Pollak impossibility 
theorem as follows: 
 
Theorem  2 (Feldman and Serrano 2008): Assume n = 2. The assumptions of complete and 
transitive social preferences, weak Pareto, neutrality/monotonicity, complex diversity, and 
no dictator are mutually inconsistent. 
For the proof of theorem-2 see Feldman and Serrano (2008). 
 
Innocuous Dictators in Single-profile Arrow Theorem 
   We have seen that in multi-profile case a dictator may be dangerous. In single-profile 
case, a dictator may be innocuous sometimes but not always. Now we introduce examples 
of such dictators as follows: 
• If an individual i is indifferent between all pairs of alternatives by definition he 
is a dictator. 
• If weak Pareto is satisfied by the society then everyone is a dictator. 
• If in a society of 100 individuals 80 have identical preferences, then these 80 
individuals are dictators. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
    In this paper we have analyze Arrow’s impossibility theorem of multi-profile preference 
version and two single-profile preference versions. We have tried our best to explain the 
paper in easier ways by introducing examples, definitions and easier mathematical 
calculations. In the single-profile case we used simple-decisive set, diversity, neutrality (for 
theorem-1) and a stronger assumption neutrality/monotonicity, and complex-diversity (for 
theorem-2). In every case we have obtained a dictator. We have observed that in multi-
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profile case a dictator may be dangerous but in single-profile case, a dictator may be 
innocuous sometimes but not always. 
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